RULING No. 3/2026 (06.03.) OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT OF HUNGARY

regarding findings on constitutional requirements

On the constitutional complaint, the full session of the Constitutional Court – with the concurring reasoning of constitutional court judges, dr. Ágnes Czine and dr. Marcel Szabó, and with the dissenting opinion of constitutional court judges, dr. Tünde Handó and dr. András Patyi – has issued the following

r u l i n g:

1. The Constitutional Court – ex officio – finds that, in the application of the first clause of Section 185(2) of Act II of 2012 on infractions, infraction procedure and the infraction records system, the constitutional requirement arising from Article II of the Fundamental Law is: penalty for infraction shall only be imposed if the conduct in question directly endangers the person approached for the purpose of handing over money or the public use of public space.
2. The Constitutional Court rejects the constitutional complaint seeking the declaration and annulment of the first clause of Section 185(2) of Act II of 2012 on infractions, infraction procedure and the infraction records system as breaching the Fundamental Law.

R e a s o n i n g

I.

1. 1. The petitioner requested through a legal representative (lawyer dr. Noémi Fanni Molnár), on the basis of Section 26(1) of Act No. CLI regarding the Constitutional Court (hereinafter Abtv.), both the finding of the first clause of Section 185(2) of Act II of 2012 on infractions, infraction procedure and the infraction records system (hereinafter: Szabs. tv.) (“A person who engages in begging in a public space or public place imploring passers-by or persons in the public place to hand over money and also who mendicates going from house to house or home to home commits an infraction”) as contrary to the Fundamental Law, and its annulment.
2. 1.1. In the court proceedings forming the basis for the submission of this petition, the Central District Court of Pest –changing the decision of the […] District Police Station of the […] Police Headquarters, issued as infraction  authority – has overturned the fine of 50,000 forints imposed on the petitioner for the infraction of begging and issued a warning instead.
3. According to the facts established by the Court, on 07.09.2021. at 11:20 am, at […] address, the petitioner approached passer-by’s seeking to be given money. The infraction authority therefore imposed a fine of 50,000 forints for committing infraction that falls under and contravenes Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv.
4. The petitioner – through legal representation – issued an objection against the infraction authority and requested a trial hearing. In the objection, the petitioner denied committing an infraction, maintaining the decision was not well founded. Though the petitioner admitted the begging, but not to committing infraction, as they had not approached passer-by’s seeking to obtain money, but had instead sat silently holding a sheet of paper. Hence, in the petitioner’s opinion, their actions constitute as silent begging.
5. The infraction authority did not amend or revoke its decision; consequently, in accordance with Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv., it referred the case files to competent district court.
6. The Central District Court of Pest has emphasised in its order No 3.Szk.22398/2021/5, that the police report clearly states: the police officers observed at the scene that the petitioner was approaching passer-by’s with palms facing upwards, begging for money. The court listened to the personal report of one of the police officers involved, who confirmed the contents of the police report.
7. On the basis of the evidence, the court found that the petitioner committed their actions by approaching passer-by’s and attempted to ask for money. This conduct is factual and dangerous to society, considering that the protected interests offended are public order, the right to undisturbed privacy, and the right of children to healthy development. The court has also emphasised that absolute necessity could not be established as grounds for absolving liability. Furthermore, it noted that the petitioner does not maintain regular contact with a job centre, does not hold a jobseeker’s certificate, and had not applied for benefits at the local government office.
8. Due to the above, the court found that the petitioner’s liability for the infraction with which they were charged could be established beyond reasonable doubt.  Additionally, the court amended the legal consequence determined by the infarction authority and issued a warning to the petitioner instead of imposing a fine. In doing so, the court took into account that the petitioner no longer begs, works as a casual labourer, and has not been fined or issued with an on-the-spot fine for an infraction in the past two years.
9. 1.2. According to the petitioner’s position, the first clause of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv. violates Articles II and VI of the Fundamental Law. 
10. According to the petitioner’s position, the contested provision of Szabs. tv. violates Article II of the Fundamental Law, because the proceedings and penalty sanction behaviour falling within the petitioner’s general freedom of conduct arising from human dignity, and does so by means of tools of criminal law enforcement. At the same time, the sanctioning of the form of begging in question does not only entail the threat of criminal sanctions, but – in the absence of the possibility of seeking help from members of the community – may also jeopardise a person’s livelihood. Through criminalization, the lawmaker thus implements a form of state intervention which, within the meaning of Constitutional Court Rulings No. 73/2009 CC (06.10.) and No. 37/2011 CC (05.10.), deprives individuals of the minimum level of subsistence. In these rulings, the Constitutional Court explained that the function of preventing unauthorised state interference derives from the protected dignity of the individual, and that the state has an obligation to guarantee the minimum standard of living.
11. The petitioner pointed out that the general freedom of action is not absolute; it may be restricted where there are constitutionally justifiable grounds, in accordance with the requirements set out in Article I(3) of the Fundamental Law. It is therefore necessary for the purposes of the constitutional review to identify the fundamental rights and constitutional values protected by the facts of the case, that is to say, those which form the basis for the restriction. According to the position of the petitioner, it is clear that the conduct described in the first clause of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv. neither infringes nor endangers human life, physical integrity, or health. Moreover, the petitioner pointed out the lawmaker has already addressed the sanctioning of conduct that seriously infringes upon the privacy of others by classifying such conduct as harassment [see Section 222(1) of Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code (hereinafter: Btk.)]. It thus follows that, within the scope of restrictions on fundamental rights, only the protection of public order may be invoked as a constitutional value. 
12. The petitioner, in discussing the necessity of the restriction, pointed out that, based on the statistical data published by the Ministry of the Interior, it can be established that the form of begging in question is among the most frequently committed infractions. It was also pointed out that actual payment of on-the-spot fines and monetary penalties is negligible, meaning that fines imposed for begging do not offset the costs to the central budget. According to the petitioner, the constitutional significance of this lies in the fact that, since the offence of begging is committed by people in financial need, the imposition of a fine is unsuitable for eliminating the social causes of begging. According to the petitioner, the application of sanctions to begging – as a status offence linked to poverty – has no effect whatsoever: the number of proceedings does not decrease, nor does the recovery rate of the fines imposed improve.
13. With regard to the proportionality of the restriction, the petitioner emphasised that the Hungarian legal system adopts a multi-layered approach to behaviour that is socially dangerous or undesirable, providing for several levels of regulation. However, in the case of begging involving solicitation, the legislature has chosen to impose a penalty not by opting for a measure that imposes a less severe restriction on the fundamental right, but by establishing an offence applicable throughout the country and creating the possibility for law enforcement action and, where applicable, and subsequently as a legal consequence, or applied by way of conversion.  In the petitioner’s view, the requirement of proportionality would be met if begging by solicitation were punishable by an administrative sanction, and if the rules governing this were determined by local authorities tailored to the local community.
14. According to the petitioner’s position, the contested provision of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv. violates Article VI of the Fundamental Law, because the possibility of restricting liberty as a sanction fails to meet the requirement of proportionality. The legislation does not, in fact, allow for a graduated approach to the application of the law, for discretion, or for an assessment of the circumstances of the person subject to the proceedings in the context of liability. In this regard, a reference was made to the judgment of the European Court of Human Rights (hereinafter: ECtHR) in the Lacatus case.
15. 2. During the proceedings, the Minister of the Interior, the Streetlawyer Association and the Hungarian Helsinki Committee submitted amicus curiae briefs, and subsequently, in response to several requests from the Constitutional Court, the Minister of the Interior and – partly concurring with him – the Minister of Justice set out their positions on the constitutional complaint and the contested statutory provision in their legislative statements

II.

16. 1. The provisions of the Fundamental Law in question:

„Article I(3) The rules for fundamental rights and obligations shall be laid down in an Act. A fundamental right may only be restricted to allow the effective use of another fundamental right or to protect a constitutional value, to the extent absolutely necessary, proportionate to the objective pursued and with full respect for the essential content of that fundamental right.”

„Article II Human dignity is inviolable. Every person has the right to life and to human dignity; the life of the unborn child is entitled to protection from the moment of conception.”

„Article VI(1) Everyone shall have the right to have his or her private and family life, home, communications and good reputation respected. Exercising the right to freedom of expression and assembly shall not impair the private and family life and home of others.”

17. 2. The provision of Szabs. tv. in question:

„Section 185 (2) A person who engages in begging in a public space or public place imploring passers-by or persons in the public place to hand over money and also who mendicates going from house to house or home to home commits an infraction.”

III.

18. The Constitutional Court first examined whether the constitutional complaint met the statutory conditions for admissibility set out in Section 56(2) of Abtv. Consequently, at its sitting held on 28 March 2023, the Court declared the constitutional complaint admissible. 
19. The Constitutional Court ruled that, on the basis of the arguments set out in the petition, it is a matter of fundamental constitutional significance, whether or not the infraction defined in the first clause of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv. restricts necessarily and proportionally the petitioner’s freedom of conduct arising from human dignity enshrined in Article II of the Fundamental Law, and the right to privacy enshrined in Article VI of the Fundamental Law.

IV.

20. Prior to examining the merits of the petition, the Constitutional Court reviewed the regulatory framework relating to the constitutional issue raised in the petition, as well as its historical background, and in particular the manner in which the Hungarian legal system has penalised begging.
21. 1. The immediate historical precursors to the current regulations on begging appeared in Act XL of the Hungarian Criminal Code of 1879 on misdemeanours (hereinafter: Kbtk.). This Act comprehensively regulated infractions, by which the Act meant a group of acts and omissions that are “necessary to prohibit under penalty of punishment, or to order their performance subject to penal sanctions, in the interests of public order, the peace of citizens, and the safety of persons and property” (see: the explanatory memorandum accompanying the text of the Criminal Code). 
22. Contemporary criminal legislation thus categorised offences into three categories: crimes, misdemeanours, and infractions, in accordance with the principle of the three-fold classification of punishable acts. The former were covered by Article V of the 1878 Act on Crimes and Misdemeanours (hereinafter: the Csemegi Code) of the Hungarian Criminal Code, whilst infractions were covered by Kbtk. Begging was classified as an infraction under the regulatory system of the time.
23. Under the regulations governing begging, anyone who “begs in a public place or goes from door to door without an official permit, or who encourages children under the age of sixteen to beg, or sends them out to beg, or makes them available to others for this purpose, shall be punished by imprisonment for up to eight days” (Section 66 of Kbtk.). Kbtk. penalised with up to one month of imprisonment those, who “having been punished for begging, and where two years have not elapsed since the expiry of their last sentence, again begs in a public place or goes from house to house without official authorisation” (Section 67 of Kbtk.). Kbtk. penalised with up to two months of imprisonment those begging with or without official permit,
24. who have passed the age of fourteen, if they are gathered in a group of more than three persons in the same place; or
25. who beg outside the hours specified by the authorities;
26. those who are in possession of a weapon whilst begging;
27. those who enter a dwelling that is not open without prior permission;
28. those who feign poverty, misfortune, the absence or defect of any part of their body, a lack of sight, hearing or speech, or mental disorder” (Section 68 of Kbtk.).
29. The legal policy considerations underpinning the provisions of Kbtk. referred to above are set out in the general explanatory notes to the Csemegi Code. The underlying principle of the legislation is that most infractions do not constitute actual breach of law, but rather a violation of a law enacted to prevent breaches that might easily arise from certain acts or omissions. It is thus necessary, according to the legislation, to penalise begging, despite “neither private nor public law being breached, but in order to prevent the dangers which, as experience shows, arise from the fact that criminals often assume a pitiful guise to gain entry to private dwellings, or to scout the situation for a subsequent attack: this experience makes it necessary for begging to be either completely prohibited or subject to specific police regulations, and for those who breach this prohibition or these regulations to be liable to punishment; not because they have committed an offence against anyone, but because they have contravened the law’s prohibition.”
30. According to the rules of Kbtk., it can thus be concluded that the lawmaker intended to penalise begging as a preventative measure, primarily to ensure that such acts do not give rise to specific breaches of law. Begging may therefore have been carried out through acts of a fundamentally threatening nature.
31. 2. In the first decade of the 20th century, begging became an increasingly serious social problem, making it ever more urgent to introduce a more nuanced regulatory framework. During the review of the legislation, however, conflicting legal policy arguments focused, on the one hand, on the question of whether begging can be criminalised at all, and whether the state is free to restrict individual liberty – on the grounds of a potential threat to the law, that is, on the basis of a probable assumption – and even to temporarily deprive certain individuals of that liberty. In view of this, a key consideration in drafting the legislation was the safeguarding of individual freedom and independence, and the guarantee of freedom of action, which is a primary duty of the rule of law. On the other hand, another fundamental principle of the state, equality before the law, required that “this freedom be guaranteed equally to all, the inevitable consequence of which is the establishment of certain binding rules prohibiting acts that attack or directly endanger the security of the community, society, or the personal or property security of the individuals comprising it” (Finkey Ferenc: A csavargás és koldulás szabályozása kriminálpolitikai szempontból, Budapest, Jogállam, 1905.,   280–281)
32. It was as a result of this legislative process that Act XXI of 1913 on public nuisances caused by persons avoiding work was passed. The legislation tightened the penalties for begging, whilst emphasising that begging in itself was not regarded as a crime. According to the explanatory memorandum to Act XXI of 1913, ‘[the] right of those in need to turn to their fellow human beings, who live in better circumstances and under more favourable conditions, for help cannot be denied. The more serious forms of begging are punishable under Sections 66 et seq. of Kbtk.; and where the elements of the offence set out in this Act can be established in relation to a beggar, this Act shall apply.” This included, for example, cases where “the offender exposes himself or his family to moral degradation through a lifestyle of shirking work” (Section 3(1); see the other cases in Sections 1–4). Accordingly, the provisions of Kbtk or Act XXI of 1913 were to be applied to begging.
     
33. It is also important to emphasise, however, that Article XXI of the 1913 Act did not provide for action against elements dangerous to society in the strict sense of the term, nor for the administration of justice based on the fundamental principle of retribution, but rather for the purpose of protecting against public danger. Its aim was not punishment, but the application of security measures.
34. 3. Section 27(1) of Government Decree No. 17/1968. (04.14.) generally prohibited begging, primarily because it regarded the beggar as an embodiment of a work-shy lifestyle, someone who deliberately exempted themselves from the duty of work.
35. 4. Following the new political order, during the codification of Act LXIX of 1999 on Misdemeanors (hereinafter: the old Szabs. tv.), the legislature reviewed the regulation of begging because „the basis for declaring it unlawful regardless of place and time had become questionable”. In view of this, begging was not in itself declared unlawful (see: the explanatory memorandum accompanying the text of the old Szabs. tv.).
36. The legislation identified two types of begging offences: begging with a child and harassment-begging. The former was covered by Section 146 of the old Szabs. tv., which stated that „any person who begs in the company of a minor, or who goes from door to door begging, shall be liable to a fine of up to one hundred thousand forints”. Harassing begging was covered by Government Decree No. 218/1999. (12.28.) on certain administrative offences. According to Section 5(1) thereof „[any] person who begs in a manner that harasses others in a public space or public place shall be liable to a fine of up to thirty thousand forints.” The Decree also defined that, for the purposes of this provision, begging in a manner that harasses others means: anyone who accosts passers-by or people present in a public place with the aim of obtaining money, or anyone who goes from house to house or flat to flat begging [Section 5(3) of the Decree].
37. 5 Section 185 of the current Szabs. tv. specifies the following forms of begging: begging in the company of a child [Section 185(1)(a)]; begging in the company of a live animal [Section 185(1)(b)]; accosting persons present in a public space or public place with a view to obtaining money [Section 185(2), first clause]; door-to-door begging [Section 185(2), first clause]. 
38. The constitutional complaint concerned solely the alleged unconstitutionality of the first clause of Section 185(2) of the Public Order Act; therefore, the Constitutional Court’s examination on the merits covered this statutory provision on begging.

V.

34. The constitutional complaint is unfounded.
35. On the merits of the case, the Constitutional Court first examined whether the first clause of Section 185(2) of the Szabs. tv. infringes on the petitioner’s right to human dignity (Point V/1, Reasoning [36] et seq.), and subsequently assessed the alleged infringement of Article VI(1) of the Fundamental Law (Point V/2, Reasoning [66] et seq.). In its examination of the merits of the case, the Constitutional Court also took into account the case-law of the ECtHR, with particular regard to the judgment in the case of Lacatus v. Switzerland (No. 14065/15), in which the ECtHR examined, and in reaching its decision also assessed, the rules governing begging in Council of Europe member states – including Hungary.
36. 1. According to Article II of the Fundamental Law, “Human dignity shall be inviolable. Every human being shall have the right to life and human dignity; […]”. The Constitutional Court has set out below an overview of the inviolable essence of the scope of protection of the right to human dignity (Point V/1.1, Reasoning [37] et seq.), and its restrictable components (point V/1.2, Reasoning [42] et seq.), the general criteria for restricting the right to human dignity (point V/1.3, Reasoning [47] et seq.), and then examined whether the contested provision of Section 185(2) of the Szabs. tv. restricts the petitioner’s right to human dignity to a necessary (Point V/1.3.1, Reasoning [48] et seq.) and proportionate (Point V/1.3.2, Reasoning [58] et seq.) extent
37. 1.1. According to the Constitutional Court’s long-standing and consistent understanding, the right to human dignity ensures the absolute protection of human status and gives expression to the inviolable essence of the human being. This means that there is a core of an individual’s autonomy and self-determination which is exempt from the authority of all others and cannot be restricted, by virtue of which – according to the classical formulation – a person remains a subject and cannot be reduced to a means or an object {most recently confirmed by Ruling 19/2024. (11 November) AB, Reasoning [42]}.
38. According to the National Avowal, “[w]e hold that human existence is based on human dignity”. In light of this, the Constitutional Court has emphasised in several of its decisions that human dignity lies at the heart of the value-system of the Fundamental Law {Ruling No. 32/2021. (12.20.) AB, Reasoning [32]}. A fundamental element of human dignity is the equal freedom and equal worth of every human being. A consequence of equal freedom is the legal self-determination of every individual, which entails that every person may decide for themselves, without external coercion, on the fundamental moral and practical matters of their own life {Constitutional Court Ruling No. 11/2014. (04.04.), Reasoning [30]}.
39. In its Ruling No. 19/2019. (06.18.) AB, emphasised that “the exclusion of a person from human society constitutes a serious violation of the right to human dignity; however, it would be an affront to human dignity if the state were to abandon an individual in their vulnerable, socially marginalised situation. A state that upholds the values of the Fundamental Law must never abandon a person in need of assistance, who is destitute and unable to care for themselves; this obligation on the part of the state to provide institutional protection follows from the values of the Fundamental Law and from the state’s obligation to protect the poor and the destitute” (Reasoning [103]).
40. At the same time, the Constitutional Court also pointed out that “[a]n individual exercises the constitutional rights to which they are entitled, including the right to self-determination deriving from the fundamental right to human dignity, as a member of the community. Constitutional rights are equally vested in every member of the community; when exercising their right to self-determination, individuals must do so in such a way that they do not infringe upon the exercise of others’ constitutional rights – whilst bearing in mind the requirements of necessity and proportionality. However, the Fundamental Law also recognises a dimension of these rights relating to the individual’s responsibility towards society. For whilst freedom is the arena and scope for the free development of the individual’s personality, responsibility entails respecting the freedom of others and adhering to the rules of peaceful social coexistence. According to the National Avowal, »[w]e hold that individual freedom can only be complete in cooperation with others.« A balance must therefore be struck between the exercise of an individual’s constitutional rights and the interests of the community, as well as the exercise of the constitutional rights of other members of that community” {Constitutional Court Ruling No. 19/2019 (06.18.), Reasoning [60]}.
41. The Constitutional Court also pointed out, on the basis of a combined interpretation of Articles O and II of the Fundamental Law, that the Fundamental Law’s conception of the human being is not that of an isolated individual, but of a responsible person living within society. The Fundamental Law defines the relationship between individual and community in terms of the individual’s connection to the community, without, however, affecting the individual’s unique value {Constitutional Court Ruling No. 3132/2013 CC (07.02.), Reasoning [95]; Constitutional Court Ruling No. 32/2013 (11.22.), Reasoning [88]}.
42. 1.2. The inviolable nature of human dignity, as referred to above, is subject to absolute protection and is equal for all human beings, irrespective of their physical and mental development or condition, and also irrespective of “how much of their human potential they have realised, and why that much” [Ruling 64/1991. CC (12.17.), CCR 1991, 297, 309].
43. However, the right to human dignity does not consist solely of this “unrestricted core”; the Constitutional Court has also identified several of its constituent elements (sub-rights). These components of human dignity are linked to the right to self-determination, the right to self-identity and general freedom of action [Constitutional Court Ruling 37/2011 CC (05.10.), CCR 2011, 225, 234]. The Constitutional Court has, for example, derived the right to self-determination in healthcare from the right to self-determination [Constitutional Court Ruling No. 56/2000 CC (12.19.), CCR 2000, 527, 529], or the parties’ right to dispose of their own affairs in legal proceedings. The right to a name {Constitutional Court Ruling No. 27/2015 CC (07.21.), Reasoning [45]} and the right to ascertain one’s biological parentage {Constitutional Court Ruling No. 13/2020 CC (06.22.), Reasoning [50]} are linked to the protection of self-identity.
44. According to the Constitutional Court’s understanding, by virtue of the general freedom of action deriving from human dignity, in a constitutional democracy citizens are – in a legal sense – free to do anything that is not prohibited by a normative provision. As a consequence of the protection of this general freedom of action, the state is obliged to respect the freedom of the individual, regardless of whether the individual’s action falls within the scope of protection of a specific, strongly protected fundamental right. In other words, state institutions may not interfere arbitrarily with the freedom of individuals. The state must weigh up the interests of every individual equally and justify any restriction on freedom appropriately, using rational arguments. Legislation may therefore classify a conduct as infringing an individual right or public order, and consequently as prohibited, only if there is an appropriate constitutional justification for doing so {Ruling No. 176/2011. CC (12.29.), CCR 2011, 622, 628; see also: Ruling 30/2017. CC (11.14), Reasoning [79]}. 
45. The Constitutional Court, in its ruling No. 19/2019. (06.18.) AB, emphasized its previously described practice concerning the Fundamental Law’s view on personhood together with the idea that the exercise of constitutional rights is inseparable from the fulfilment of constitutional obligations and compliance with constitutional prohibitions. Autonomy of an action is therefore an inherent right of human dignity, but in cases of alleged infringement of this right, one must take into account the close interdependence of the fulfilment of obligations (cooperation) and the observance of prohibitions alongside the exercise of constitutional rights. Offences, as forms of conduct posing a threat to society – albeit to a lesser extent than crimes – always constitute a limit on the autonomy of action deriving from human dignity (Reasoning [102]).
46. In the case law of the ECtHR, human dignity is regarded as an integral part of the spirit of the European Convention on Human Rights (hereinafter: ECHR). The Court takes the view that a person’s dignity is seriously undermined if they do not have sufficient means of subsistence. By begging, the person concerned chooses a certain way of life with the aim of escaping an inhumane and uncertain situation. The ECtHR holds that seeking assistance from others is a right protected within the scope of human dignity [Lacatus v. Switzerland (14065/15) 2021.01.09., paragraphs 56 and 59]. In the case law of the ECtHR, therefore, begging is a form of the right to seek assistance from others, which forms part of personal autonomy.
47. 1.3. According to the case-law of the Constitutional Court, the right to human dignity is absolute and unrestricted only insofar as it defines human status and in its unity with the right to life; however, certain aspects of this right may be restricted, in the same way as other fundamental rights {Constitutional Court Decision No. 30/2013. (28 October) AB, Reasoning [23]}. In view of this, the Constitutional Court examined below whether the contested provision of Section 185(2) of the Szabs. tv. restricts the petitioner’s general freedom of action arising from human dignity in accordance with the fundamental rights-test set out in Article I(3) of the Fundamental Law. In doing so, the Constitutional Court took into account the paramount importance of human dignity within the system of fundamental rights, as well as the conception of humanity set out in the Fundamental Law as described above, which expresses the view that the Fundamental Law protects the individual not in isolation but as a member of the community.
48. 1.3.1. In examining the necessity of restriction, the Constitutional Court points out, first and foremost, that begging always presupposes a situation involving severe existential uncertainty, a situation in which those forced to beg often find themselves through no fault of their own. As the Constitutional Court has already pointed out in relation to homeless people: “the fact that they live in public spaces constitutes an extremely serious crisis situation, which has arisen as a result of various pressures and is, in the rarest of cases, the consequence of a conscious, well-considered, and free choice” {Constitutional Court Ruling No. 38/2012 (14 November), Reasoning [50]}. With regard to this group of people, the Constitutional Court therefore attached particular importance to the other measures taken by the state to alleviate the situation of those affected.
49. In this specific case, the Minister of the Interior set out in detail the forms of assistance available to those in need under Act III of 1993 on Social Administration and Social Benefits (hereinafter: Szt.). Under Szt., persons lacking the income necessary for their livelihood may be provided with cash benefits (e.g. benefits for people of working age and old-age pensions) and benefits in kind (e.g. public health care, healthcare services) on the basis of social need. People who have lost their homes are assisted by national and municipal services such as social outreach organisations, day centres (day centres for the homeless), meals (soup kitchen services), institutions providing temporary accommodation (overnight shelters), and institutions providing long-term accommodation (rehabilitation centres).
50. The Constitutional Court then examined how the first part of Section 185(2) of the Szabs. tv. fits into the current system of infraction law.
51. The Szabs. tv. fundamentally altered the function and place of the institution of infractions within the legal system. The previous legal framework – as the Constitutional Court pointed out in its Ruling No. 63/1997 (12. 12.) — regarded administrative offences as a “Janus-faced” legal institution, because some infractions constitute so-called acts against the administration (e.g. carrying out an activity subject to a licence without a licence), whilst others constitute conduct that violates the general rules of social coexistence, so-called criminal acts (e.g. forms of property offences distinguished by a value threshold) (ABH 1997, 365, 367– 368.).
52. By contrast, Szabs. tv. regulates misdemeanours solely as a means of combating “criminal acts”. The preamble to the Act defines the purpose of the legislation as ensuring “effective action against criminal acts that harm or endanger the generally accepted rules of social coexistence, but do not pose a level of risk or danger required for being punishable as a criminal offence”. Since Szabs. tv. treats infractions as criminal acts, its regulation has shifted towards the ‘bagatelle’ approach of criminal law. This approach has resulted in “the creation of a quasi-trichotomous system, clearly bringing the law on administrative offences closer to criminal law” (see: Explanatory Memorandum to Act XXXI of 2012). 
53. Taking all this into account, it can be concluded that infractions have lost their role in sanctioning conduct directed against the public administration, and their nature as “minor criminal offences” has become predominant. With the Szabs. tv., the infraction has essentially become the third and mildest level of the three-tier criminal justice system. It fulfils a similar role within the legal system to that of the institution of ‘kihágás’ (minor offence), which was introduced by the Criminal Code and subsequently abolished by Decree-Law No. 17 of 1955 on the abolition of the institution of ‘kihágás’ and ‘kihágási’ adjudication {Ruling No. 38/2012. (XI. 14.) CC, Reasoning [27]}.
54. The Constitutional Court has already pointed out in several of its rulings that “[a] law […] may classify conduct as infringing an individual right or public order, and consequently as prohibited, only if there is an appropriate constitutional justification for doing so. In the case of criminal offences, this is typically the case where the act endangers human life, physical integrity, health or rights, or breaches a generally accepted rule of coexistence, and where the classification of the offending conduct meets the requirement that criminal sanctions may only be applied as a last resort” [Constitutional Court Ruling No. 176/2011 CC (12.29), ABH 2011, 622, 628].
55. Article XXII(2) of the Fundamental Law has placed the use of public spaces for public purposes under explicit constitutional protection. In doing so, the constitutional authority has made it clear that the protection of the use of public spaces for public purposes is a constitutional value, which may form the basis for imposing administrative penalties on conduct that jeopardises such use.
56. In its Ruling No. 19/2019. (06.18.), the Constitutional Court pointed out that “the protection of the use of public space for public purposes under the Fundamental Law is justified by the fact that such space is of a ‘finite number’, and also by the fact that use for public purposes means use that is open to the community as a whole (to anyone) and is in the interests of the community as a whole. Any use deviating from this may only be exceptional and subject to statutory conditions. It follows from the above that the use of public spaces for public purposes by anyone is also limited by the need to respect the rights of others” (Reasoning [56]).
57. In view of all this, the Constitutional Court held that the protection of the public use of public spaces is a constitutional value which justifies the necessity of the restriction on human dignity provided for in the first clause of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv.
58. 1.3.2. The Constitutional Court then examined the proportionality of the restriction on fundamental rights.
59. In this regard, the Constitutional Court points out, first and foremost, that the primary legal policy rationale behind the regulations on begging is prevention. The historical background to the legislation, as outlined in Section IV, also confirms that even under Kbtk., the legislature did not classify begging as unlawful in its own right, but rather to prevent other, more serious offences (e.g. disorderly conduct, trespass) or criminal offences (e.g. endangering a minor). This legal policy rationale continued to shape the development of the legislation following the new political order.
60. The Constitutional Court points out that it scrutinizes strictly any infringement of the abstract constitutional values relating to public order and public tranquillity. “Otherwise, the vast majority of activities taking place in public spaces would become liable to sanctions, as in many cases they have a disruptive effect on the cityscape and residents’ sense of well-being, and are usually accompanied by noise” (Constitutional Court Ruling No. 176/2011 (12.29.) CC, ABH 2011, 622, 630). In light of this, the Constitutional Court examined which types of conduct could constitute the offence referred to in the first part of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv.
61. Under the contested provision of Szabs. tv., “A person who engages in begging in a public space or public place imploring passers-by or persons in the public place to hand over money (...) commits an infraction.” According to the case law, such solicitation may take place either verbally or in writing; the essential element is that the offender expresses their demand for money in a personalised, addressed manner. Typically, the addressee is aware of the statement and is forced to choose whether or not to hand over money. The manner in which the offence is committed can vary greatly: verbally, it may range from a polite approach to aggressive, violent communication, whilst in writing it often takes the form of presenting a written text.
62. In the present case, the court found the petitioner liable for infraction because he committed the act by actually approaching passer-by’s and attempting to ask them for money. The court noted that this conduct is factual and poses a danger to society, given that the protected interests of this infraction are public order, the right to privacy, and children’s right to healthy development.
63. With regard to the interpretation of the contested provision of Szabs. tv., the Constitutional Court begins, first and foremost, from the premise that domestic legislation does not criminalise begging in itself. The Constitutional Court emphasises that the contested wording of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv., is consistent with Article II of the Fundamental Law – as is also evident from the decision of the court hearing the present case – that liability for a infraction may be established only in the event of a direct threat to the aforementioned legal interests. 
64. In its assessment of proportionality, the Constitutional Court noted that the legislation allows law enforcement authorities a margin of discretion. Thus, the infraction authority has the option to tailor the penalty to the gravity of the offence, and it is also possible for the authority to assess the personal circumstances of the person subject to the proceedings, paying particular attention to the extent to which the person concerned has fulfilled their obligation to cooperate in relation to the use of the social welfare system. The Constitutional Court points out that, in the petitioner’s case, the penalty imposed with final effect by the Central District Court of Pest differed significantly from the decision of the infraction authority. The case forming the basis of this constitutional complaint therefore clearly illustrates that the court exercised its discretion to treat the case on an individual basis and, having regard to the petitioner’s personal and financial circumstances, issued a warning instead of the fine of 50.000 forints originally imposed by the police.
65. In light of the above, and in particular given that the first clause of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv. can be interpreted in a manner consistent with the Fundamental Law, the Constitutional Court dismissed the constitutional complaint in relation to Article II of the Fundamental Law.
66. 2. In the petitioner’s view, the contested provision of Szabs. tv. also infringes the right to the protection of private life guaranteed by Article VI(1) of the Fundamental Law.
67. The Constitutional Court has confirmed in several of its decisions that the right to human dignity also encompasses the right to the protection of privacy. It is the consistent practice of the Constitutional Court to regard the right to human dignity as one of the manifestations of the so-called general right to personality, of which the protection of privacy is one aspect [Ruling No. 34/2009 (03.27.) CC, ABH 2009, 282, 289]. The scope of protection of human dignity therefore encompasses the protection of privacy in the context previously set out by the Constitutional Court: an essential conceptual element of privacy is that others must not be able to intrude into it or look into it against the will of the person concerned [Constitutional Court Ruling No. 36/2005. (10.05.) CC, ABH 2005, 390, 400].
68. According to the consistent case law of the Constitutional Court, there is therefore a particularly close link between the right to privacy enshrined in Article VI(1) of the Fundamental Law and the right to human dignity guaranteed by Article II of the Fundamental Law. Article II of the Fundamental Law establishes the protection of the inviolable sphere of private life, which is entirely exempt from any state interference, as it forms the basis of human dignity. However, under the Fundamental Law, the protection of private life is not limited to the inner or intimate sphere, which is also protected by Article II of the Fundamental Law, but extends to private life in the broader sense (maintaining relationships) and to the physical sphere in which private and family life unfolds (the home). Furthermore, the image formed of an individual’s life also enjoys independent protection (the right to a good reputation) {Constitutional Court Ruling No. 32/2013 (11.22.) CC, Reasoning [82]–[84]; similarly: Constitutional Court Ruling No. 17/2014. (05.30.) CC, Reasoning [29]}. 
69. In view of the above, the Constitutional Court concluded that the petitioner’s arguments put forward in relation to Article VI(1) of the Fundamental Law are not substantively connected to the protection of privacy under that provision of the Fundamental Law, but rather can be interpreted within the framework of Article II of the Fundamental Law, in the context of the right to human dignity. The Constitutional Court therefore, having assessed the petitioner’s arguments as set out above, dismissed the petition on the grounds of a lack of substantive connection with regard to Article VI of the Fundamental Law.

VI.

70. 1. In addition to dismissing the constitutional complaint, the Constitutional Court also took into account that the Minister for the Interior, summarising the experiences of those applying the law to the facts of the case, reported that, in police practice, the element of ‘harassment’ is not always fulfilled by active, harassing behaviour that endangers the person or fundamental rights. The Constitutional Court emphasises that the administrative authority’s interpretation of the law in the present case is of particular significance because, in proceedings based on the first clause of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv., the infraction authority’s decision becomes final without judicial review in a significant proportion of cases.
71. The Constitutional Court therefore examined below whether the imposition of penalties for this form of conduct is compatible with constitutional requirements. In doing so, the Constitutional Court also took into account that the statistical data provided to it by the Minister of the Interior show that, between 1 January 2012 and 31 December 2022, approximately 4000 – 5000 proceedings were initiated annually for offences under the first clause of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv. In 70–75% of these proceedings, fines (on-the-spot fines, monetary fines) were imposed. The average amount of the fines was 27’000–30’000 forints.  On average, 3–7% of the fines imposed in this way were paid by the persons fined. The rate of conversion to custodial sentences ranged from 13 to 66%, but there was one year (2021) when nearly 70% of on-the-spot fines were converted into custodial sentences. In view of this, it can be concluded that, due to the first clause of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv., in a significant proportion of cases the person subject to the proceedings is in fact sentenced to a custodial sentence as a result of the conversion.
72. The Constitutional Court points out, first and foremost, that under Section 1(1) of Szabs. tv., “[an] infraction means an activity or omission that is dangerous to society”. For the purposes of Szabs. tv., “an activity or omission is dangerous to society if it harms or endangers the state, social or economic order as laid down by the Fundamental Law, or the person or rights of natural or legal persons or organisations without legal personality to a lesser extent than required for being punishable as a criminal offence” [Section 1(2)]. According to the legislative intent underlying the legislation, the law on infractions must simultaneously provide protection against conduct that poses a lesser threat to fundamental values and against conduct that threatens values deemed by the law to be “still” worthy of protection. This duality permeates both the development of the law on infractions and the current legislation (Explanatory Memorandum to Szabs. tv.).
73. The Constitutional Court also points out that, according to the relevant wording of the National Avowal in the Fundamental Law, “We hold that the common goal of citizens and the State is to achieve the highest possible measure of well-being, safety, order, justice and liberty”. Alongside the human dignity of the individual and their general freedom of action lies the common aim of citizens and the State. In accordance with the binding interpretative framework provided by the National Avowal, which governs all provisions of the Fundamental Law, the security of the community, order in public spaces, and the right of everyone to the safe use of public spaces are therefore factors that must be taken into account.  
74. The defining element of an infraction is the danger posed to society. According to the historical traditions of Hungarian legislation, begging in itself does not pose a danger to society and therefore does not, in itself, constitute an infraction. In the case of begging, a danger to society can be established only if it directly endangers the persons or rights of those using public spaces. The legislator expressly emphasised in the explanatory memorandum to Section 146 of the old Szabs. tv. that “[t]he Act does not declare begging to be unlawful in itself”. According to the explanatory memorandum to the current Szabs. tv., the provisions on the establishment of individual infractions are based on the infractions previously in force.
75. The legal policy objective underlying the regulation of begging in Hungary is to prevent other, more serious infractions or criminal offences from being committed. The classification of begging with a child as an infraction clearly illustrates this legal policy objective. In this case, the legislative aim is that, since it can reasonably be presumed that a child is at risk in cases of begging with a child, sanctioning the act as an offence can prevent the child from being put at risk. According to the explanatory memorandum to the old Szabs. tv., this is therefore “regarded as an »additional« element of the offence of endangering a minor – where habitual, lifestyle-related commission cannot be established – it is regarded as a minor offence if the offender incites a child to beg or commits the act together with the child.”
76. The act of begging is an endangering act under infraction law, it is therefore not a prerequisite that the act has an actual effect, that is to say, that it actually infringes upon the person approached for the purpose of obtaining money or their rights. However, if an actual infringement of rights does occur, then typically another infraction or criminal offence will be established.
77. It can be concluded, on the basis of the above, that begging is not unlawful in itself; it is punishable as an infraction only if it poses a direct threat to the safety of others. If this cannot be established, the act is not subject to sanctions for an infraction. Undoubtedly, this includes cases where begging takes the form of silent solicitation. In such cases, it cannot be established that there is a situation directly endangering the safety of others – including users of public spaces. 
78. The Constitutional Court also points out that, in accordance with the case-law of the ECtHR, begging cannot be criminalised on the grounds of passive behaviour, that is, where it does not take the form of an active, aggressive or persistent act. Begging cannot, in itself, be unlawful merely because its occurrence in a public place disturbs others or is considered inappropriate. According to the ECtHR’s position, it is therefore not punishable for someone to beg by holding out their hand or holding a cup. In its case law, the ECtHR emphasises the importance of individual assessment, or evaluation: whether the offender was in a potentially vulnerable situation, whether the begging took on an aggressive nature, and whether it can be established that the offender was a member of a criminal network [Lacatus v. Switzerland (14065/15), 19 January 2021, paragraph 102].
79. 2. Under Article 46 (3) of the Abtv., the Constitutional Court may, in proceedings conducted in the exercise of its powers, issue a ruling establishing those constitutional requirements arising from the provisions of the Fundamental Law and serving to give effect to the provisions of the Fundamental Law, with which the application of the legislation under review or applicable in court proceedings must comply.
80. In accordance with the Constitutional Court’s established practice, the laws and rights should be upheld as far as possible. The Constitutional Court avoids annulling a statute or a statutory provision, or calling upon the legislature to enact legislation within a time limit set by the Constitutional Court, if the constitutionality of the legal order and legal certainty can be ensured without doing so. In such cases, the Constitutional Court generally defines the scope of interpretations that satisfy constitutional requirements, in which case the legislation is in accordance with the Fundamental Law {Constitutional Court Ruling No. 20/2022 (10.13.) CC, Reasoning [28]}.
81. Section 46 (3) of the Act on the Constitutional Court authorises the Constitutional Court, in proceedings conducted in the exercise of its powers, to issue a ruling establishing those constitutional requirements arising from the provisions of the Fundamental Law and serving to give effect to the provisions of the Fundamental Law, with which the application of the legislation under review or applicable in court proceedings must comply. In Ruling No. 20/2022 (10.13.) CC, the Constitutional Court pointed out that the text of a statutory provision may be interpreted not only on the basis of grammar but also using other methods. In the specific case, the Constitutional Court established a constitutional requirement because, although the grammatical interpretation of the law by the government office and the court was consistent with the wording of the contested statutory provision, it was not consistent with the teleological interpretation of the provision in accordance with the legislature’s intention. 
82. Based on the history of the regulation of begging outlined above, it is clear that the legislative intent behind the regulation has always been that begging in itself is not a punishable offence and does not pose a threat to society. Administrative sanctions may only be imposed in cases where behaviour poses a threat to public order or the safety of others. Furthermore, when imposing such penalties, due consideration must be given to the social circumstances of the person subject to the proceedings, their cooperation with the social welfare system and their actual need for assistance.
83. In the present case, with a view to giving greater weight to these interpretative considerations, the Constitutional Court deemed it necessary, by establishing a constitutional requirement pursuant to Section 46(3) of Abtv., to make it clear that the constitutional requirement arising from the first clause of Article II of Szabs. tv. is that a penalty for a minor offence may only be imposed if the offending conduct directly endangers the safety of the person approached for the purpose of handing over money or the public use of a public space. 
84. Pursuant to Section 44 (1) of Abtv., the decisions of the Constitutional Court must be published in the Official Gazette; the format of such publication is determined by the Constitutional Court, having regard to the constitutional requirement, pursuant to paragraph (4)(a) of Section 1 of Ruling 2001/2026. (I. 14.) CC Tü. on the designation and publication of the Constitutional Court’s rulings.

Budapest, 19 May 2026

Dr. Péter Polt ,

President of the Constitutional Court

Concurring reasoning of constitutional court judge Dr. Ágnes Czine

85. In this case, the Constitutional Court examined the provision in Section 185(2) of the Criminal Code which makes it a criminal offence to approach people in a public place with the intention of obtaining money. Essentially, the Court had to determine whether begging is punishable if the conduct in question does not amount to an active act that endangers the safety of others. 
86. 1. First and foremost, I consider it important to emphasise that, in the course of social coexistence, individuals are inevitably exposed to external influences. Under current legislation, the maintenance of peaceful coexistence in public spaces is protected by a number of norms concerning infractions. At the same time, it is a fact of general social reality that there are people in society who are disadvantaged and poor through no fault of their own. In the present case, it was necessary to examine the fundamental rights considerations against which the last resort of begging – as a means of survival – by people belonging to the most disadvantaged sections of society can be assessed, provided that it does not jeopardise peaceful coexistence. I consider it a key constitutional principle that the Creed of the Fundamental Law unequivocally states: “We profess the duty to assist the destitute and the poor.”
87. The Constitutional Court contacted the competent minister on several occasions in this case with a view to clarifying the practice of applying the contested provision of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv. In the course of these enquiries, it became clear that, according to the current practice of the infraction authorities, active criminal conduct is not required; the act of begging is deemed to have taken place simply by addressing individuals verbally with the intention of obtaining money, without any further conduct being necessary. The Minister specifically pointed out that, for the offence to be factually established, it is not necessary for the beggar to approach the person addressed. Under the current practice of the infraction authority, for example, it is a punishable offence for someone to silently beg for money in a public place by holding up a sign.
88. On the other hand, the Minister’s response also highlighted the contested provision of Szabs. tv. is frequently applied. In the vast majority of cases, it is not a warning but a fine that is imposed, which – as it is not paid – is typically converted into a custodial sentence. In other words, it is not merely a matter of the administrative authority penalising the act of accosting people in public places for the purpose of handing over money as a result of its application of the law, but rather of applying the most severe legal consequences to the persons subject to the proceedings.
89. 2. According to Article 28 of the Fundamental Law, when applying the law, the text of legislation must be interpreted primarily in accordance with its purpose and in harmony with the Fundamental Law. 
90. The legislative intent behind the regulation of begging has always been that begging in itself is not a punishable offence and does not pose a threat to society. The legislator expressly emphasised in the explanatory memorandum to Section 146 of the old Szabs. tv. that “[the] Act does not declare begging to be unlawful in itself”. According to the explanatory notes to the current Act on Misdemeanours, the provisions establishing the various offences are based on the offences previously in force.
91. In Hungary, the regulation of begging has a tradition dating back to 1879, which took into account both the need to assist the destitute and the protection of other members of society. In interpreting the first clause of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv., I believe that neither the interpretation in accordance with the legislature’s intention nor the historical traditions of the legislation can be disregarded. Consequently, just as in the case of the constitutional requirement set out in Constitutional Court  Ruling No. 20/2022. (10.13.) CC, a purely grammatical interpretation of the first clause of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv. does not satisfy the constitutional requirements arising from the relevant provision of the Fundamental Law (in this case: Article II).
92. In view of the above, the constitutional requirement set out in the operative part expresses an interpretation of the first clause of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv., which, in my view, therefore does not go beyond the scope of legal interpretation and does not infringe the principle of the separation of powers either.

Budapest, 19 May 2026

Dr. Czine Ágnes., constitutional court judge

Concurring reasoning of constitutional court judge Dr. Marcel Szabó

93. I supported the resolution. In my view, a clear distinction must be made between, on the one hand, ‘silent begging’ and begging that involves addressing passer-by’s to ask for money, and, on the other hand, begging of a harassing nature that clearly infringes on the safety of others or public order (in many cases, unfortunately, whilst under the influence of alcohol or other mind-altering substances). The constitutional requirement makes it clear that, in the first case, no liability for an infraction may be established and no sanction imposed (in the absence of a danger to society as defined in Section 1(1) of Szabs.  tv.), whilst in the second case I consider official intervention to be acceptable.
94. Having regard, in part, to the principle of adherence to the terms of the application and, in part, to the fact that the Pest Central District Court had issued a warning to the petitioner, the Constitutional Court was unable, in the present proceedings, to examine the question of the extent to which the imposition of a fine is permissible in cases of the infraction of begging, particularly in view of the fact that, in every single case, begging is explicitly caused by the serious financial circumstances of the person concerned, and therefore, in such cases, the rate of payment of fines (as can be seen from the amicus curiae submissions and ministerial responses received) is very low, and in most cases, unpaid fines are converted into a custodial sentence. This constitutional problem cannot be remedied by the constitutional requirement set out in the present decision in cases where liability for an infraction is established; I therefore consider it absolutely necessary to examine this issue on the basis of a further motion specifically addressing this problem. 

Budapest, 2026. május 19.

Dr. Szabó Marcel, alkotmánybíró

Dissenting opinion of constitutional court judge Dr. Tünde Handó

95. I do not agree with the way the constitutional requirement has been formulated. The wording of the constitutional requirement does not provide a constitutional interpretation of the statutory provision; rather, it effectively renders the content of the statutory provision meaningless. In this way, the requirement is tantamount to annulling the provision, as it renders the legislation practically inapplicable. In my view, a finding of constitutional omission would have been justified, since what is lacking in the legislation is a degree of gradation which would more effectively ensure that the conduct described in the offence and the associated penalty or measure are applied in a manner consistent with the Fundamental Law.
96. I would like to state at the outset that I agree with the constitutional reasoning set out in the decision, which is also cited in Ruling No. 19/2019. (06.18.) CC: “The right to human dignity is seriously infringed upon when a person is excluded from human society; however, it would be an affront to human dignity if the state were to abandon an individual in their vulnerable, socially marginalised situation. A state that upholds the values of the Fundamental Law must never abandon a person in need of assistance, who is destitute and unable to care for themselves; this obligation on the part of the state to provide institutional protection follows from the values of the Fundamental Law and from the state’s obligation to protect the poor and the destitute” (Reasoning [103]).
97. 1. In the present case, the court found the petitioner liable for an infraction because of committing the act by approaching individual passer-by’s with a view to obtaining money: walked up to them and asked them for money verbally. The court – overturning the decision of the administrative authority – imposed a warning.
98. The act committed was identical to that described in the first clause of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv. In its statement, the Ministry of the Interior, when consulted, emphasised that Szabs. tv. does not generally prohibit begging, but only prohibits it where it takes place in a harassing manner, involving the solicitation of money. With regard to police practice, it stated that “the offence is, however, constituted in itself by the act of addressing individuals verbally with the intention of obtaining money. No further elements of conduct – such as approaching passer-by’s – are required to constitute the offence of begging; however, in many cases, offenders do indeed intrude upon the privacy of passer-by’s in order to attract attention or to achieve the coercion they seek.” He described the practice of on-the-spot enforcement as typically involving the issuing of a verbal warning, the imposition of a fine, or the filing of a report; furthermore, if the behaviour is not ceased despite the verbal warning, the person concerned is taken into custody. Based on this practice, the question rightly arises as to what conduct actually constitutes – in a manner recognisable even to an outside observer – the facts of the case: does ‘verbal expression’ mean the targeted, verbal address of a specific passer-by in a manner recognisable to other passer-by’s (approaching and addressing them, or shouting at them from a distance), or does even the display of a written note also qualify as a ‘verbal’ address? Furthermore, the practice of on-the-spot enforcement also appears unclear, namely in which cases a warning, a fine or a report to the authorities is issued. With regard to the latter, it is unclear on what criteria and how the police officer taking action is to assess the nature and manner of the conduct, its frequency, and the personal circumstances of the offender. The shortcomings in the statutory provision – as reflected in practice – which give rise to legal uncertainty could have justified a finding of a constitutional omission. 
99. 2. The constitutional requirement set out in the operative part of the decision necessitates the presence of additional elements such as ‘a direct threat to the safety of the person addressed’ and/or ‘a direct threat to the public use of a public space’. According to this requirement, an infraction cannot be established in the absence of a ‘direct threat’. The relevant reasoning in the decision identifies only a single form of conduct – one that is recognisable even to an outside observer and which has hitherto been clearly implied by the statutory definition – as not constituting an offence: “where begging takes the form of silent solicitation.” However, the explanatory memorandum does not explain on what grounds accosting passer-by’s for the purpose of obtaining money can be identified as a direct threat. It would be significant to establish whether the offender intends to pose a direct threat, or whether this creates a sense of immediate danger to the safety of the passer-by’s who are approached, or whether it creates a sense among other passer-by’s that the public use of the public space is directly threatened? Can the police officer at the scene substantiate this by taking statements? The constitutional requirement imposes an additional requirement that cannot be identified by an outside observer from the conduct constituting the statutory offence, the foreseeability and provability of which are uncertain. This effectively renders the statutory offence meaningless. Alternatively, however, it steers the law enforcer in a direction whereby, in order to establish the offence, the fulfilment of other offences under the Act on Public Order and Security is also required, e.g. disorderly conduct, dangerous threats, or defamation.
100. In my view, the constitutional requirement in question exceeds the limits set out in the Fundamental Law, as it effectively nullifies a statutory provision without explicitly stating so. By contrast, under another interpretation, it lays down additional elements of the offence in such a way as to usurp the legislature’s powers. Meanwhile, rather than strengthening legal certainty, this additional requirement leads to legal uncertainty: it is not made any clearer to the perpetrator of the act, the police officer taking action, or even passer-by’s, as to which conduct is prohibited.
101. 3. Section 1 of Szabs. tv. – like the Criminal Code – attaches significance to the danger posed by a given act to society when defining the concept of a misdemeanour. Section 1(2) itself refers to criminal law as the yardstick for assessing whether an act or omission poses a danger to society: “[…] which infringes upon or endangers the state, social or economic order as set out in the Fundamental Law, or the person and rights of natural and legal persons, as well as organisations without legal personality, to a lesser extent than is necessary for it to be punishable as a criminal offence.” The decision – citing the explanatory notes to the legislation and Constitutional Court rulings – characterised Szabs. tv. as a tool for combating ‘criminal acts’ and as having shifted the regulatory framework towards ‘petty offence’ criminal law. Indeed, under the heading ‘Certain infractions’, the Szabs. tv. regulates dozens of types of conduct for which there is a directly corresponding criminal offence, but there are also dozens for which no such direct correspondence exists.
102. “Noli tangere cirkulos meos” – said Archimedes to the Roman soldiers trampling on the circles he had drawn in the sand during the siege of Syracuse. Applied to everyday life, this saying means that every person is entitled to their privacy or comfort zone, free from unnecessary interference by others. Szabs. tv. bears similarities to criminal law in terms of its structure, procedural rules, the link between the facts of the case and the penalty (measure), and so on. Certain offences defined in Szabs. tv. are not necessarily to be regarded as minor offences in terms of their nature; rather, they often involve breaches of prohibitions that would constitute the natural rules of people’s everyday, peaceful coexistence (consideration, discipline, etc.). Examples include: unauthorised use of a title, infringement of the right to practice religion, breach of public decency, endangering others with a dog, disturbing the peace, unauthorised bathing, and being on the ice. The legal definition of begging in question can also be classified among these. The point is that it is a natural rule of human coexistence that passersby should be able to move about on the street without unnecessary disturbance.
103. Despite the similarities in criminal law, it is therefore a mistake to interpret and assess Section 1 of Szabs. tv. with the same meaning and weight as the concept of ‘danger to society’ under the Criminal Code. Here, the constitutional requirement sets a standard for the elements of a misdemeanour which disregards the purpose and intent of the statutory provision.

Budapest, 19 May 2026

Dr.  Tünde Handó, constitutional court judge

Dissenting opinion of constitutional court judge Dr. András Patyi

104. Pursuant to Section 66(2) of the Act on the Constitutional Court, I am attaching a dissenting opinion to this decision because, whilst I supported point 2 of the operative part of the decision—namely, the dismissal of the constitutional complaint— I did not agree with the constitutional requirement set out in point 1 of the operative part of the decision, which holds that the penalisation of begging as an infraction is only consistent with the Fundamental Law if further conditions, not expressly set out in the text of the Act, are met. 
105. My position on the question of whether the majority decision can be upheld was based on the interrelationship between the provisions set out in the operative part, as well as on the limitations on the Constitutional Court’s powers.
106. 1. By dismissing the constitutional complaint seeking a declaration that the first clause of Section 185(2) of Szabs. tv. was contrary to the Fundamental Law and its annulment, the Court took the view that the provision in question could be regarded as compliant with the Fundamental Law, a view with which I concurred as set out below.
107. In the constitutional review of the contested provision of Szabs. tv., the binding interpretative framework provided by the National Avowal of the Fundamental Law is of no small significance; according to this, “[w]e profess that the common aim of the citizen and the State is the fulfilment of a good life, security, order, justice and freedom”. The decision itself refers to this common aim of citizens and the State, adding that “[t]he common aim of citizens and the State stands alongside the individual’s human dignity and general freedom of action. In accordance with the binding interpretative framework provided by the National Avowal, which governs all provisions of the Fundamental Law, the aspects to be taken into account are therefore the security of the community, order in public spaces, and the right of everyone to the safe use of public spaces”.  
108. I believe that the very purpose of public spaces is to ensure that they are places of order, tranquillity and peace. The use of public spaces is part of citizens’ everyday lives; they are not areas exempt from fundamental rights, and their use – especially in larger towns and cities – is essential for people to exercise their right to freedom of movement and freedom of choice of location (people use roads, squares, parks, underpasses, etc. for transport or other purposes). 
109. The threat of sanctions for begging in public spaces, in its current legal form, does not infringe upon the right to human dignity or the right to privacy of the person begging; rather, it protects the rights of others and their peaceful enjoyment of those rights. After all, every person is entitled to use public spaces open to them for their intended purpose – such as walking or moving about in other ways – in safety, without being accosted for the purpose of being asked for money. Approaching someone, which is an active, deliberate, verbal act, infringes upon the private sphere of a person using public spaces for their intended purpose, since it is not the person who approaches the beggar with the intention of offering support or money, but rather the beggar who approaches them, disturbing them whilst they are exercising their own fundamental constitutional right without hindrance. 
110. I therefore agree with the findings of the ruling; I, too, believe that begging in itself is not unlawful. Nor does the contested statutory provision prohibit or penalise so-called ‘silent begging’, which does not involve addressing members of the public but, by displaying a text or sign, expresses that the person in question is in need of or is asking for help or support, thereby enabling those who so wish to provide such support or help. 
111. On these bases, the form of begging made punishable under the Penal Code does not restrict any fundamental right.
112. 2. To reject a constitutional complaint challenging the provision of Szabs. tv. regulating begging (on the grounds that the provision is in conformity with the Fundamental Law), whilst at the same time formulating a constitutional requirement that supplements the statutory provision, is contradictory.
113. In its Ruling No. 38/1993 (06.11.) CC, handed down prior to the entry into force of the Fundamental Law and setting out the concept of constitutional requirements, which was issued prior to the entry into force of the Fundamental Law and which developed the concept of constitutional requirements, the Constitutional Court stated that “[i]f the constitutionality of a statutory provision is in question precisely because of a deficiency or ambiguity in the regulation, the Constitutional Court may expressly define the scope of constitutional interpretation and specify the constitutional requirements with which interpretations of the provision must comply.” 
114. If the legislation under review has one or more interpretations that comply with constitutional requirements, the Constitutional Court is not necessarily required to find the legislation unconstitutional. The provision need not be annulled in every case merely because an interpretation that does not meet constitutional requirements is possible or occurs. However, in the constitutional review, the interpretation of the legislation consistently followed in legal practice – that is, the normative content of the legislation as manifested in >>living law<< - cannot be disregarded. If the legislation thus comes into force with content that is unconstitutional, a finding of unconstitutionality and the application of its legal consequences are unavoidably necessary” (ABH 1993, 256, 266-267.)
115. Section 46(3) of Abtv. expressly empowers the Constitutional Court to establish constitutional requirements arising from the provisions of the Fundamental Law and serving to give effect to those provisions, with which the application of the legislation under review or applicable in court proceedings must comply. Pursuant to the relevant provision of Abtv., the primary function of a constitutional requirement is to enable the Constitutional Court to determine, for the benefit of those applying the law, the interpretation of the legislation that is consistent with the Fundamental Law, insofar as such an interpretation exists. If no such interpretation exists, the legislation must be annulled.
116. The constitutional requirement is not a ‘tool’ for formulating additional conditions not contained in the legislation.
117. Had the provision of Szabs. tv. regulating begging in public places been consistent with Article II of the Fundamental Law only with the addition specified in the constitutional requirement, the provision would have been annulled. However, if, following an examination of the facts and a substantive review of the case, the Court finds the provision to be in conformity with the Fundamental Law as currently worded, the addition to the provision falls outside the scope of the legal consequences that the Constitutional Court may apply.  
118. The Abtv. does not authorise the amendment of the text of the Act or the standardisation of its application. Any such amendment based on conditions not derived from the Fundamental Law essentially amounts to law-making, over which the Constitutional Court has no jurisdiction. Pursuant to Article 25(3) of the Fundamental Law, the task of ensuring legal uniformity also falls not to the Constitutional Court but to the courts, primarily the Supreme Court.
119. Article 24(1) of the Fundamental Law defines the constitutional role of the Constitutional Court as being the supreme body for the protection of the Fundamental Law, and stipulates that, in order to fulfil this role, the Court shall exercise the powers and functions set out in the Fundamental Law and in the cardinal law, and shall determine the legal consequences set out in the cardinal law, thereby placing all provisions of the Fundamental Law under its protection and ordering their defence.
120. In keeping with modern constitutions based on the rule of law, the provisions of the Fundamental Law not only set out fundamental rights but also, alongside the objectives of the State and organisational provisions, lay down detailed rules governing the separation of powers. 
121. This is how the main powers of the legislative (and, more broadly, the law-making) authority, the executive (including its manifestation in the administration of public law), and the judiciary are defined, thereby essentially establishing not only the limits of these powers but also the limits of the powers of other state bodies (branches of state power) in relation to one another; for the public authority entrusted by the Fundamental Law to the courts (in the form of judicial application of the law) as the administration of justice precludes anyone else from exercising judicial power. Similarly, by establishing legislative powers, the system of the separation of powers laid down in the Fundamental Law does not permit other bodies (constitutional bodies not authorised to legislate) to act as legislators or to assume such a role.
122. The Constitutional Court must therefore avoid straying beyond its primary function of safeguarding the Fundamental Law into other areas of the separation of constitutional powers, and, where appropriate, becoming a legislator.
123. 3. Overall, the constitutional requirement that only behaviour constituting begging which directly endangers the safety of the person approached for the purpose of receiving money, or the public use of public spaces, fulfils the elements of the offence, contains, in my view, an additional condition that cannot be derived from the Fundamental Law, which not only reduces the scope for penalising the offence in question but also diminishes the ability to maintain order in public spaces and protect the rights of others. It is the role of the legislature, not the Constitutional Court, to amend the statutory provision to include such a condition. 

Budapest, 19 May 2026

Dr. András Patyi, constitutional court judge

Constitutional Court Case No.: IV/822/2022.

• • •